Introduction

Kipling R. wrote his novel “Kim” based on his XIX century imagination and a series of anecdotes. Today’s literature borrowed its central term from Kipling. The concept of the New Great Game [1; 2; 3; 4] has been structured and explained differently by different scholars at different times. However, the relevant literature does not recognize the fundamental difference between the nineteenth century state-centric system and the modern system of the twenty-first century. Many of the analyses that use this concept do so without any qualification or reservation. In the following, I focus on the persistent shortcomings that are characteristic of the studies discussed [4; 5; 6; 7]. The Caspian Sea, which lies in the middle of Eurasia, is an isolated water basin with no natural connections to other seas or oceans but for networks of rivers and canals. Currently, canals built to the branches of the Volga and Don Rivers link the Caspian Sea, which borders the Russian Federation, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, to the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea [8; 9; 10]. The Caspian Sea, which has garnered prominence owing to the oil wells near Baku, is not only a significant waterway for ancient trade but has also been known “by other historical names, including Caspium, Acem, Bab el-Ebvab, Cil, Deylem, Curyan, Baku, and Tabaristan Sea” [10, p. 281]. The Caspian Basin is more than 371,000 square kilometers in size, 1,200 kilometers long from north to south, and 320 kilometers wide on average. “Kazakhstan has a coastline of 2,320 kilometers on the Caspian Sea, followed by 1,200 kilometers in Turkmenistan, 955 kilometers in Azerbaijan, 724 kilometers in Iran, and 695 kilometers in Russia” [1, p. 256].

The Caspian, the world’s largest closed water basin that is not directly connected to the oceans, is suitable for oil and natural gas resources as well as the sturgeon fish, which has a high economic return. In addition to its geographical importance, the rich hydrocarbon resources of the Caspian Basin have further increased the strategic value of the region since the 20th century. Today, “there is a geopolitical and geoeconomic struggle between regional and global powers that want to be effective in the hydrocarbon resources in the Caspian and in the transportation of these resources to international markets” [8, p. 402]. 

The Caspian Sea's advantageous position and subterranean riches have long served as the primary driving forces behind the conflict for the area. Maintaining control over the oil and natural gas resources in the Caspian Sea and expanding its influence in the former Soviet states was one of Moscow's top goals, particularly following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. With the help of strong oil corporations and brand-new pipeline projects, the United States and the European Union (EU) sought to neutralize Moscow's energy position during this process. As China's economy grows and its energy demands rise steadily, the Caspian area and its governments have emerged as a significant alternative for the China’s government [9, p. 136–137]. Four options for Central Asian governments without ocean or marine links to open up to the outside world arose in the post-Cold War era. First, from the north of the Caspian Sea, they were to reach Europe and the Atlantic via Russia; second, from the south of the Caspian Sea, to the Pacific via China; third, from the south via Afghanistan, to the Indian Ocean via India or Pakistan; and fourth, from the south of the Caspian Sea, to the Mediterranean via Turkey or Iran. Comparing these routes reveals that in the 1990s, Turkey, Russia, and Iran engaged in a major race to open up to the West via the Caspian Sea [7, p. 182].

Zbigniew Brzezinski also argued that the energy struggle in the Caspian Sea was not only an economic problem but also a geopolitical one. The famous geopolitician stated that if the pipelines continued to pass through Russia and exit from the Black Sea, Moscow would maintain its strong influence in the region without making any significant moves. In contrast, the transportation of energy resources in the Caspian Sea to Turkey via Azerbaijan and then to Europe was seen as an important project that could break Russia’s energy monopoly.6 For this reason, many large Western companies made investments in the region in the early 1990s and tried to put a plan in motion in this direction. Azerbaijan, which is close to Turkey both politically and geographically, has been the country that has taken the most serious steps in cooperating with the West. In parallel with these developments, Azerbaijan rejected Russia’s request for a military base and opposed Russia’s request for a project that would reach a Black Sea port instead of a pipeline from Georgia to Turkey [6, p. 195–196].

As M. Bilgin says that: “The appeal of Western investments in coastal states like as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan is growing. Because Russia is not currently involved in particular energy projects in the region. This is prompting the aforementioned states to distance themselves from Moscow” [5, p. 161]. In our opinion, Russia should take immediate action to avoid this. On the other side, Russia and Iran believed they would incur significant economic losses and lose their political and economic sway over these three fledgling Turkic republics if they processed and shared their oil resources with ease. In fact, a number of Russian elites have long maintained that it would be better not to exploit the region's resources if Moscow did not have complete control over the Caspian Sea. In a way, it was better not to find the treasure than to have economies in the area dominated by foreign money. Currently, Russia's most crucial strength in comparison to Western nations is its abundance of energy resources, which gives Moscow an edge. Because Russia is the second-largest producer of natural gas and oil in the world, after the United States of America. Greece, Austria, and Hungary are 60% dependent on Russian gas, while Latvia, Slovakia, Finland, and Estonia are 100% dependent; Czechia, Bulgaria, and Lithuania are 80% dependent. The impact of Russia on Europe's energy requirements is evident in the international ties between the European Union and Russia. The Caspian Basin has gained prominence in this context during the 1990s, despite the fact that Europe's reliance on Russia for oil has given rise to new initiatives [12; 13; 14; 15; 16; 17].

The creation of the Caspian Sea's new international legal status was the most pressing matter. The resolution of this problem became the main focus of the Caspian area governments' energy strategy, as it was more important to the region's future growth. The primary economic concerns surrounding the execution of projects intended to establish international transportation routes, advance shipping, and build coastal infrastructure were a significant aspect of multilateral cooperation.

The Goal and Methods

The goal of this research is to evaluate the status of energy resource reserves and production in the Caspian Basin, their geo-economic and geopolitical significance in the global energy market, the orientation of regional and global powers toward the region, and the importance of energy resources in reaching the region's markets for Russia and Azerbaijan's energy security. For this case study, a thorough literature research was undertaken, and the findings were evaluated descriptively utilizing qualitative methodologies. Because of Russia and Azerbaijan's fortunate geographical position in the Caspian Basin, they have a significant impact on transit communications between the sea basins. The Caspian Basin, on the other hand, suffers greatly from a lack of access to the sea. Azerbaijan and other countries in the region will gain more political and economic strength as they become more aware of their disadvantage as a result of Russia's powerful and strategically positioned position. Because Russia is the most effective, vital, and indispensable country in exporting the region's abundant energy resources to Western nations.

Thus, both theoretical studies and the international legal framework governing the developing situation in the Caspian Sea lag behind the constantly evolving and changing reality, necessitating additional regulation and indicating that this aspect of international law is not sufficiently developed theoretically.

Materials and Results

The Question of the Caspian Sea's Legal Status

Up until 1991, Russia and Iran shared the Caspian Sea, which is regarded as the world's biggest lake geographically. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan became independent, and the Caspian region's political landscape underwent significant shift. Since then, there are now five states that border the Caspian Sea instead of just the two, and there are more people debating the region's legal status. Rich in energy riches, the legal status of the Caspian Sea has unavoidably become a major point of contention between surrounding governments. Resource exploitation in the region has also long been hampered by disputes over the boundaries of the nation’s surrounding the Caspian Sea [2, p. 47]. 

The first major question about the Caspian's classification is whether it should be considered a sea or a lake because it is an isolated body of water with no connections to the oceans. All five riparian governments put up various recommendations and occasionally modified their own views along the process, as each naturally sought to ascertain a position that would best suit its own political and economic interests. The talks could not produce a conclusion for a long time because the topic of whether the Caspian is a sea or a lake and the agreement reached on this matter would have distinct consequences for each state. Russia now maintained that the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea could not be enforced in the Caspian because it was not a sea. For many years, Moscow has advocated for a unique status based on cooperative management in the Caspian, referring to it as a "closed water basin.". Preventing the area from obtaining an international status and the influence of non-regional players in the Caspian are the primary goals of the Russian administration in this regard [1, p. 272].

The Iranian government, which has long profited from the Caspian Sea's resources alongside Russia, has likewise backed the thesis of the Caspian Sea's shared usage and maintained opinions about the region's status that are strikingly similar to the Moscow administration's theses. Periodic political events have caused them to periodically dispute over the Caspian Sea, although both sides have quickly moved over these differences. Because Moscow and Tehran have become closer due to geopolitical realities rather than commercial objectives in the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea. Tehran has not stopped trying to obstruct efforts in this direction under various pretexts since it finds the strategic links that Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan would develop with the West through Turkey difficult in terms of its own interests. Because of this, it has also voiced strong opposition to significant initiatives like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, which uses Georgia to transport Azeri oil to Turkey's Mediterranean ports [1, p. 277–278]. 

Another country bordering the Caspian Sea is Azerbaijan, which calls the sea a "border lake" and has demanded that its seas and underwater areas be divided in accordance with each country's own zone of sovereignty for all mining, including oil. The Baku government is vehemently opposed to Moscow's plan for shared usage, arguing that it is not customary. Stated differently, Azerbaijan views the division of the Caspian Sea into areas under state sovereignty as more important than the sea or lake status of the region. In fact, Baku – the entity that first put up the concept of a "border lake" – has declared that the Caspian Sea may receive maritime status and may ratify the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Azerbaijan's primary objective is for every coastal state to have the autonomy to govern its own territory [11; 13; 14; 15; 16; 17]. But Kazakhstan, claimed that the Caspian should be governed by the terms of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and described the region as an "internal sea." Despite this, the primary objective of the Nur Sultan administration has been the acceptance of sovereign powers over its own coastlines, not legal status. With a few exceptions, the ideologies of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are comparable in this regard [17, p. 7]. 

Turkmenistan's position on the Caspian Sea has been hazy for a while and has changed during the process, as is the case with many international issues. Turkmenistan said that the accords of 1921 and 1940 could be put into effect until a new status was decided, despite the country being closer to Moscow and Tehran's theses until February 1997 in particular. During this period, Turkmenistan – which in particular claimed rights to several Azerbaijani oil fields – had major disagreements with Baku and grew more in line with Iran's theses. Nonetheless, Kazakhstan and Turkey's efforts at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Istanbul Summit in November 1999 were able to resolve the issues between Baku and Ashgabat. Following the conference, Turkmenistan started working with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan on the Caspian Sea's status [20, p. 620].

In reality, for years, Iran and Russia – two of the three riparian nations with the fewest borders to the Caspian Sea – have promoted the concept of dividing up the five nations' portion of the region's resources equally so that they may reap the most benefits. In reality, this reasonable-seeming plan calls for pooling Azerbaijan's, Kazakhstan's, and Turkmenistan's subterranean resources. Because of this, even if these three nations disagreed with the thesis at hand, their arguments kept the Caspian Sea's riches from being used to their maximum potential for a long time. Tensions between the two countries have periodically risen as a result of this circumstance. Specifically, the Central Asian republics declared during their 1991 process of independence that they would uphold all agreements signed by the Soviet Union, such as the 1940 and 1921 accords and the Almaty Declaration signed by the Caspian littoral nations.

But over time, Baku and Ashgabat questioned the legality of the Soviet Union-Iran accords, claiming that the 1940 and 1921 agreements were vague on the exploitation of seabed resources. These governments contend that the in issue accords gave Iran and Russia substantial advantages while failing to safeguard their own interests. They thus called for the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to be ratified and the Caspian to be divided into national zones.

But it's also important to keep in mind that the majority of Russia's reserves are located on the shelf of the Barents and Karelian Seas, not in these two regions. How transportation will be done in the Caspian Sea is another area of contention. Iran, Russia, Oman, and India inked a deal on September 12, 2000, to begin building the North-South Transportation Corridor. Within this scope, a transportation network is intended to run from the Indian Ocean to Iran's Bandar Abbas Port and, via Russia and the Caspian Sea in the north, to European nations. The goal of this kind of strategy is to make sure that the economic corridor moves geopolitically from the south to the north [14].

Another significant project is the Middle Corridor, which Ankara has once again placed to the Turkic Council's agenda. This project begins in Turkey and travels by rail and road connections to Georgia and Azerbaijan, reaching the Caspian Sea. From there, it travels to China via the Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, or Kyrgyzstan route. The ports of Baku/Alat, Aktau/Kuryk, and Turkmenbashi are utilized in this framework for various modes of transit throughout the Caspian Sea. The transport ministers of the Turkic Council nations signed a Joint collaboration Protocol to facilitate collaboration within the framework of the Middle Corridor. In addition, it is observed that the east-west corridor is functioning better in terms of trade and transport lines. The moves of Turkey and China are especially important at this point.

The Russian authorities acknowledge the significant rise in influence from the US and Turkey, and that these nations now pose a danger to Russian interests in the Caspian. In addition to wanting Western investments and technology, several of the littoral governments also want a Western presence to balance out any possible Russian meddling. Curiously, though, it doesn't seem like Russia is pursuing a single, cohesive strategy in this area. Generalizing, however, it is possible to identify several overarching objectives that appear to support the positions of all the ministries:

first, secure a friendly buffer zone to ensure Russia's security and geopolitical interests; secondly, ethnic tensions in the region may have an impact on Russia. Therefore, Russia is obliged to ensure stability in the region. third, maximize the economic benefits from Azerbaijan's substantial oil and gas deposits if possible; fourth, dismantle US power in the region; fifth, weaken the re-emergence of OPEC; finally, strengthen ties with Iran and join the Caspian via a pipeline with the Persian Gulf. The policies and actions of former CIS economic supporter, Boris Berezovskiy, have further reinforced these objectives. Berezovsky has tried to support Russian interests in the region.

Using local conflicts to their advantage, penetrating the littoral states from the inside (using the Russian private firm Lukoil or another firm to negotiate favorable agreements with a littoral that the Russian government cannot achieve), treating the Caspian Sea area as a zone of Russian interest or influence (in the psychological or ideological sense), and creating legal and other barriers to prevent new competitors from participating in foreign investments in the Caspian region are some possible strategies to achieve these goals. Russia may, for instance, try to obstruct any pipeline that connects Azerbaijan to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, or Baku-Ceyhan (Turkey).

The Volga-Don canal's effective blockage would be another barrier. This system connects the Caspian and Black Seas in low flow during the winter and leads into the internal European waterway network. For huge offshore drilling rigs and other Caspian support equipment, this is basically the sole point of entry. We believe that if Russia does not rapidly handle some of the issues in the Caspian area, it will cause political challenges for the region's republics. The Volga-Don canal was closed to ships flying the flag of Azerbaijan by the Russian government during the conflict with Chechnya that lasted from 1995 to 1996. Due to the unresolved situation in the Caspian, Russia has now restricted transit to Azeri boats. Regarding the "question of maintaining joint use of the Caspian Sea's water surface and water mass for purposes of ensuring freedom of navigation and compliance with uniform standards of fishing and environmental protection," Russia has made it clear that it is prepared to sign papers with Azerbaijan [10, p. 5].

Russia needs to be able to get into the subterranean gas and oil reserves in order to have any influence in the area. It has never been easy to remove these minerals from the Caspian Sea region. Three often mentioned Russian explanations highlight the challenges associated with producing oil from the Caspian. Initially, there are issues with the oil's quality. Its high sulfur content reportedly "requires additional financing for expensive corrosion-resistant pipes for transport" [15].

The Caspian Sea is a confined body of water situated at a considerable distance from the areas where it is consumed. Long transportation distances have an impact on the oil's ultimate cost. An average of $2 to $5 is needed to pump one ton of Persian Gulf oil, $10 for North Sea oil, and $17 for Azerbaijani oil. Oil extraction from Siberia costs between $35 and $45 per metric ton. Russia is understandably concerned about the loss of cash profits if both are exporting to the same markets, given the Caspian markets are twice as inexpensive as the Siberian markets. Last but not least, the Caspian Sea is situated in a region plagued by extreme weather and climate, where some of the worst storms on the continent happen. The Russians say that the difficulty of extracting minerals from this location is second only to Siberia [13, p. 16].

According to Russia, the preferred route of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium seems to be headed toward execution. Russia accepts this for a variety of reasons. To encourage members to use the route, all CPC members have first committed to pay Russian transit costs, regardless of whether oil is supplied. Second, during the first operation of the route, Russia is authorized to send eight million tons of oil a year (of a total capacity of 28 million tons) through the pipeline, and if they lack enough Kazakh crude, they can replace oil produced in Russia.

Lastly, Russian businesses own 44% of CPC, guaranteeing a substantial financial return on their investment. Operating at maximum capacity should result in the annual pumping of about 20 million tons of oil (out of a total capacity of 67 million tons) to the port of Novorossiysk in Russia. Investor confidence in the project should be bolstered by the fact that the current component of the CPC pipeline, which will feed into new construction, is only 10 years old. Russia's inability to influence the international game taking place around the Caspian Sea has led to a decrease in the need for littoral states to distance themselves from the Kremlin, as it increases the likelihood of instability in the region.

The Baku-Ceyhan corridor is the second pipeline alternative that keeps proving to be resilient. The US Ambassador to the Caspian Sea, Richard Morningstar, stated in late December 1998 that although the pipeline would be constructed, it is unclear when – 2002, 2004 or 2006 – it will be done. Determining the availability of oil alone, as well as the economic incentives and even the building subsidies provided by the transit governments of the pipeline, required a considerable amount of time. Finally, in November 1999, an intergovernmental agreement was concluded by Turkey and Azerbaijan to promote the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan line. Now, those states need to come to a consensus with Georgia. Additionally, negotiations are underway between Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to let oil to traverse the Caspian Sea and enter the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline.

Russia has experimented with a number of methods to manage competition. Russia has effectively employed economic cooperation as a tactic. For instance, Russia's willingness to participate in the commercial exploitation of offshore Azerbaijan resources was shown by Lukoil's admission into the AIOC. Russia is a crucial CPC partner, providing labor, communications infrastructure, and an existing pipeline to the projected 1500-kilometer pipeline that would run from Tengiz to Novorossiysk on the Black Sea.

In order to accomplish her goals, Russia has also used coercive measures inside the area. Russia has been slow to get transit licenses for the CPC, giving in to calls for increased regional pipeline tolls and attempting to transfer these expenses to the consortium. Furthermore, Russia is still in competition with other routes out of Baku for the offshore oil resources of Azerbaijan, while also managing the instability concerns in Georgia/Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Chechnya. Depending on the effect on Russian economic goals and political hegemony, each calls for a distinct strategy. For Russia, the Caspian Sea area presents the government a unique task. This assessment is supported by others. For instance, the Caspian Sea is a major geopolitical issue rather than an economic, geological, or engineering one, according to US former Secretary of State James Baker.

Some Russian analysts believe that workable options to meet the challenges presented above include:

Guarantee the region's energy resources' access to the global market by pressing for the Tengiz-Novorossiysk CPC major pipeline's development, accelerating the building of a pipeline that avoids Chechnya, and rejecting the Baku-Ceyhan proposals for Caspian energy access. Use every tool at your disposal to cut off the Turkish route, including diplomatic maneuvers, political and economic pressure on neighbors, increased psychological and informational influence on ethnic Russians outside of Russia, support for national liberation movements in the Trans Caucasus and the near East, and the closure of the Volga-Don waterway system. Take advantage of long-standing and unavoidable animosities between some western participants in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium, which give the Russian Federation a wide range of maneuvering opportunities. Address and resolve international political issues: Russia needs to create a cohesive plan for its many ministries of power and infrastructures with large corporations; back pro-Russian organizations and groups in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); back the "enemies of our enemies" in the Near and Middle East and South Asia; form an alliance or relationship with China, Iran, India, and Iraq to balance out Western organizations; and redirect efforts toward CIS integration (as of yet, excluding Azerbaijan). Redefine the key geostrategic elements of Russian national security as follows: set limits on what Russia will allow or will not allow on its southern borders and give this area more attention; create a system to counter threats and devise a system to gauge the level of risk posed by the south; and incorporate the country's "southern policy" into its national security doctrine.

Thus, the analysis indicates that it is untenable for Russia to initiate a new confrontation in the Caspian area and the South Caucasus. Because any new crisis in the area would reduce power there, with political and economic consequences for Moscow. This is especially crucial because initial expenditures made in oil extraction processes won't pay off for 35–40 years. Long-term strategy and stability thus remain essential components. Without them, Russian influence in the region may fall too far behind to be of any concern to the other littoral states in the coming years.

Discussion

New status: the deal of the century?

Disagreements in the area are also fueled by political considerations. The many political systems of the Caspian region define them. Every nation has unique features, despite a general trend toward authoritarianism becoming stronger. For instance, Azerbaijan is an Islamic state but a secular one, whereas Iran is an Islamic state where the statehood is granted to the spiritual authority. In the event that the Caspian Sea is not ultimately divided, the competition for hydrocarbon resources at the regional level will drive coastal governments to develop their naval capabilities. Outside partners are willing to assist with this. The US specifically collaborates with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Turkey and Azerbaijan have good relations. The issue is made worse by the engagement of two major regional countries, Iran and Turkey, who are on opposing sides of the conflict with the United States, in the military domain (selling of military equipment, training of military personnel, etc.).

Their strategic partner in NATO is the second, and their strategic enemy is the first. The pursuit of hegemony by both nations in the Caspian Sea region only serves to exacerbate the conflict rather than find a solution, posing hazards and difficulties to the already precarious regional security framework. After 25 years of discussions, there was an agreement reached during the 5th Summit of the Heads of State of the Caspian Countries, which took place in Aktau, Kazakhstan on June 12, 2018. These discussions were attended by Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and then-Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. During the summit, which covered potential areas of cooperation in the Caspian Basin's economics, transportation, security, and environment, the five governments came to an agreement on the document that essentially establishes the Caspian's legal position. Protocols for collaboration in areas including border security, organized crime, and terrorism prevention, as well as averting conflicts in the Caspian, were also inked [3, p. 19].

In regards to the region, a new process has been sparked by the decline of global order and international relations. In fact, all coastal states came to an agreement in August 2018 after making concessions on their own positions. The increase in interventions, especially in crisis regions, and the expansion of confusion in the global system have been effective in the will of regional nations to settle their problems among themselves [12]. According to the agreement, the Caspian Sea will be accorded a special status and the depth of the water will be established based on the lake concept, not adopting the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. With an estimated 50 billion barrels of oil and 8.4 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves, a new process has now begun in the energy sea [17; 19].

The agreement agreed says that the Caspian Sea's surface would be shared among the coastal governments in accordance with international law, while the bottom and resource-rich areas will be split among them. The Caspian Sea will henceforth be regarded as neither a lake nor a sea. The necessary work will be completed in accordance with the pipeline installation, with consideration given to ecological considerations. The seabed borders have not yet been discussed, but whereas a multilateral agreement was previously necessary, the fact that bilateral agreements would be implemented with the agreement obtained is a very major advance. Security is one of the main outcomes of the Agreement on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea. It is forbidden for foreign armed forces to be present in the Caspian Sea, with the exception of the five coastline nations. Particularly on the request of Moscow and Tehran, this provision was inserted into the wording of the accord. Discussions over the usage of the airspace in the basin will go on. Because the Black Sea-Caspian region is the focus of close attention from other countries, including Iran, Turkey, the Balkans, the Middle East, the United States, and China. It is a zone of competition and confrontation between the world's leading powers. The south of Russia remains the most vulnerable link in the Russian post-Soviet system: armed conflicts periodically break out here and there is a constant potential threat of their new emergence. Thus, in the modern world process, states are trying to implement various models of socio-political security. NATO member countries, led by the United States, consistently defend the thesis of the need to implement a collective security model with a primary focus on the military-technical power of the bloc; the national strategies of these states consider the option of interfering in the internal affairs of other states under the guise of protecting their own national interests [18, p. 43–44]. According to the agreement; Each state will have a fishing area of ten nautical miles and territorial seas up to fifteen nautical miles in the Caspian Sea. States must be permitted, in compliance with the order recognized in international agreements, to install main pipelines and undersea cables on the bottom of the Caspian Sea. The path that will be used to construct pipelines and undersea cables across the seabed will be decided upon in consultation with the state. With the exception of the nations that border the Caspian Sea, no foreign military forces will be present in the region. The country adjoining the region has the right to develop, use and operate artificial islands, infrastructures and buildings. We'll make an effort to find peaceful solutions for any issues pertaining to the Caspian Basin.

Why Russia agreed to this deal in August 2018 and conceded on some points is now a crucial topic that has to be addressed. Indeed, while the accord is of considerable economic importance for the three Turkic republics, Moscow and Tehran regard the arrangement in the Caspian Sea primarily from a political and geopolitical standpoint. The outcomes of the Caspian state chiefs' fifth summit significantly influenced the five-sided collaboration in important sectors. First and foremost, all of the Caspian states have focused especially on the growth of their economies and transportation systems throughout the past 10 years. Despite the lack of support from the participating nations for the establishment of the Caspian Economic Cooperation Organization (CECO), which they saw as premature, an intergovernmental agreement was reached about trade and economic cooperation. This enabled the establishment of a new platform for communication, the Caspian Economic Forum (CEF), and sparked discussions between the pertinent ministries of the participating nations. As a consequence, on August 11–12, 2019, were discussed the inaugural CEF was held in Turkmenbashi, where topics of trade and economic cooperation, as well as soliciting foreign investment [18].

From another side Washington places a high value on the region, it is significant that in January 2018, Kazakhstan and the US struck an agreement in principle on the use of the Aktau and Kurik ports for humanitarian purposes instead of military activity. The Caspian Five's agreement on August 12, 2018, was greatly influenced by this accord in concept. Following this US action in the region, Russia and Iran began to back down from some of the long-standing differences they had been voicing due to their growing fears about a foreign military push in the region. In fact, after the agreement, the US could not set up a military post on the Caspian shore, according to the Kazakh Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Despite this, the US oil corporations' presence in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan gives these emerging nations more room to compete with Moscow and Tehran (87). In summary, by making some compromises in an effort to thwart any foreign military action in the Caspian Sea, Russia and Iran have demonstrated that they view the region from a geopolitical and security-oriented perspective. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan intended to earn major economic advantages with the pact. In actuality, initiatives with this goal started to be worked on following the agreement.

The region's nations are now working together more closely in the sector of transportation thanks to the fifth Caspian summit. As a result, the governments of the Caspian republics signed a five-party agreement on cooperation in this field during the summit. The goal of the document is to steadily turn the area into a significant center for logistics. This agreement sparked talks amongst the Caspian states' relevant ministers, who have long been debating matters pertaining to the unification of national transportation laws and the removal of obstacles that hinder the region's ability to draw in more transit cargo.

The region has seen the implementation of several transit and transportation developments in recent decades. European governments funded the Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus-Asia (TRACECA). The "One Belt, One Road" worldwide project for economic cooperation was proposed by China. Furthermore, the concept of establishing an international transport corridor (ITC) dubbed the "South-West" and a Trans-Caspian route is being put out by extra-regional entities and nations in the area. Furthermore, the "North-South" multimodal ITC is still in the creation stage. It was established to transport products from Asia to Europe and back, based on an intergovernmental agreement between Russia, India, and Iran on September 12, 2000. On February 14, 2020, the Russian government approved a package of actions to develop it, which should improve the project's efficacy.

The Caspian republics have been busily building port infrastructure for the past ten years. There is now more motivation for rebuilding the ports that already exist and for building new ones. Every year, the Caspian states make more investments in this field. Specifically, national initiatives have been created with the goal of boosting the amount of cargo that has to transit through the ports of the nations in the area. The expansion of cooperation between the Caspian countries is accompanied by increased competition between them for commodity flows, primarily transit ones. The struggle for container shipping volumes and hydrocarbon resources is pushing the states of the region to apply various financial and administrative mechanisms to attract cargo. The development of port infrastructure, supplemented by new railway lines, was considered by them in the context of solving their geopolitical problems. In addition to issues of economic development, primarily coastal territories, the Caspian countries sought to participate in global transit flows formed by extra-regional actors. Accordingly, the facilities that the Caspian countries have created in recent years were part of large-scale infrastructure projects. China, the EU, and Turkey were interested in their implementation, for whom the Caspian infrastructure is part of global transport flows [19, p. 40–41].

The Caspian region's states are weak and in serious political, social, and economic difficulties, which makes them susceptible. They have a tremendous deal of potential for tension and conflict. Since the mid-1990s, the USA's influence in the area has grown significantly; yet, many commentators have questioned whether the US would be willing to play a significant role in ensuring security in Central Asia or the South Caucasus. It is only possible to ensure US influence for the long run if it is a member of a global framework. On the other hand, NATO's function is evolving away from direct military support in times of crisis and toward creating a more expansive framework for subregional cooperation. It seems unlikely that NATO will have a significant impact in the case of a major confrontation in Central Asia, even though it may help maintain calm in the South Caucasus.

Conclusion

Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan's independence following the fall of the USSR necessitated a reconsideration of the Caspian Sea's legal status. This raised the question of how to use the Caspian Sea to define the borders of the coastline governments in the Caspian basin. Because the Caspian Sea's wealth of hydrocarbon resources, the intersection of energy and transport arteries, and at the same time the uncertainty of its international legal status, its strategic position against the backdrop of a high probability of "color revolutions" in the Caspian states – all this creates a potential threat to Russia's national security.

Studying the geopolitical features of the Caspian region allows us to identify possible points of intersection of interests of global players, which is especially relevant at the present stage. Studying the geopolitical features of the Caspian region gives researchers the opportunity to identify key points of confrontation and threats to Russia's national security. With the agreement reached by the parties in August 2018, the long-running and much-debated negotiations over the legal status of the Caspian Sea were brought to a certain degree of consensus. It is anticipated that talks about the Caspian Sea will go on for a very long time. China, whose population is growing globally, has also begun to influence the Caspian Sea's dynamics. China, a major energy trader, currently imports natural gas and oil from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and a deal signed in July 2020 with Iran indicates that it would purchase much more from the Caspian area. Even while Beijing appears to be challenging American sanctions with the China-Iran pact, Moscow is also concerned about China's growing influence in the Caspian Sea. With the energy deals it has struck with the Caspian littoral countries and the investments it will make as part of the One Belt One Road initiative, Beijing's profile in the Caspian Sea will only grow over time. In a global environment where energy is becoming increasingly important, the Caspian resources are becoming more valuable every day.

Western countries, especially since the beginning of the 21st century, have influenced Russia's efforts to promote peace and tolerance in the South Caucasus, which is illegal under international law, causing confusion among regional states seeking to maintain relations with Russia. For this reason, countries such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are becoming more prominent as alternatives to Russia. In short, depending on global developments, a period in which the Caspian will be on the agenda much more frequently and serious struggles will be waged for new projects may be experienced in the coming period.

We might conclude that since the Caspian Sea is an international lake, its legal system ought to be founded on the idea of partition into national sections after analyzing all viewpoints and methods for resolving the issue. Çünki the Caspian Sea's geographical characteristics, namely its lack of direct connectivity to the oceans and seas of the world, provide justification for its classification as a lake. Taking into account the above, it is considered appropriate to follow the following suggestions and recommendations in order to solve the problem of the legal status of the Caspian Sea:

The Caspian states' interests and the current international legal norms should be taken into consideration at this time; The Caspian littoral states should show a strong political will to resolve the issue and take concrete action, and for this reason should strengthen their activities through high-level meetings; The Caspian lake's status should be recognized as an international lake, and its legal regime should be established based on the principle of division into national sectors along the middle line; Russia's persistent efforts to determine the Caspian's status should be applauded. The expansion of political and humanitarian ties between Russia and the foreign ministers of the Caspian littoral states is necessary for this purpose; The Caspian littoral states' forces must be brought together in the field of Caspian ecology. The Caspian littoral states must adhere to international legal standards when using Caspian resources.